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Abstract
Political campaigning has become a multi-million dollar business. A substantial pro-
portion of a campaign’s budget is spent on voter mobilization, i.e., on identifying and
influencing as many people as possible to vote. Based on data, campaigns use statistical
tools to provide a basis for deciding who to target. While the data available is usually rich,
campaigns have traditionally relied on a rather limited selection of information, often in-
cluding only previous voting behavior and one or two demographical variables. Statistical
procedures that are currently in use include logistic regression or standard classification
tree methods like CHAID, but there is a growing interest in employing modern data min-
ing approaches. Along the lines of this development, we propose a modern framework
for voter targeting called LORET (for logistic regression trees) that employs trees (with
possibly just a single root node) containing logistic regressions (with possibly just an inter-
cept) in every leaf. Thus, they contain logistic regression and classification trees as special
cases and allow for a synthesis of both techniques under one umbrella. We explore various
flavors of LORET models that (a) compare the effect of using the full set of available
variables against using only limited information and (b) investigate their varying effects
either as regressors in the logistic model components or as partitioning variables in the
tree components. To assess model performance and illustrate targeting, we apply LORET
to a data set of 19,634 eligible voters from the 2004 US presidential election. We find that
augmenting the standard set of variables (such as age and voting history) together with
additional predictor variables (such as the household composition in terms of party affil-
iation and each individual’s rank in the household) clearly improves predictive accuracy.
We also find that LORET models based on tree induction outbeat the unpartitioned com-
petitors. Additionally, LORET models using both partitioning variables and regressors
in the resulting nodes can improve the efficiency of allocating campaign resources while
still providing intelligible models.
Keywords: campaigning, classification tree, get-out-the-vote, logistic regression, model tree,
model-based recursive partitioning, political marketing, voter identification, voter segmenta-
tion, voter targeting.
1. Introduction
“Decisions are made by those who show up”, said President Bartlet, a character from a popular
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TV show, The West Wing. The character in the show used the line to motivate a college
audience to voice their opinion by showing up at the polls. Getting eligible voters to actually
vote (“get-out-the-vote”; GOTV) is an important goal in countries with a democratic political
system and a lot of resources are spent on achieving that goal. Take the 2008 US presidential
race for example. In that year, the world witnessed the amount of money raised and spent
reaching unprecedented heights. By spending over USD 1 billion, the Obama and McCain
campaigns tried to persuade and mobilize voters to engage in the political process by casting
their vote on November 4th. However, even with monumental campaign effort, and large
out-laying of resources, only 61.7% of eligible voters did cast their ballot.
1.1. Campaigning, mobilization and turnout in the United States
The impact of partisan campaigning or nonpartisan get-out-the-vote efforts on mobilization
and turnout has been subject to numerous scientific investigations over the last 20 years see
e.g., Whitelock, Whitelock, and van Heerde (2010); Baek (2009); Karp and Banducci (2007);
Steel, Pierce, and Lovrich (1998); Finkel (1993); Gelman and King (1993). Starting from an
early ‘minimal effect’ hypothesis (i.e., the idea that political campaigns only marginally mo-
bilize, persuade or convert voters), the general sentiment nowadays is that campaigning does
indeed have measurable effects on mobilization of (core) supporters (Holbrook and McClurg
2005; Hillygus and Jackman 2003). This mobilization, in turn, has been shown to have an
effect on increasing overall turnout and on getting additional votes for a specific candidate
(Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Cox and Munger 1989).
As a result, campaigns are spending huge amounts of money on mobilizing voters. Despite this
spending, campaigns often fail to mobilize voters for the campaign’s cause. Take the United
States for example, where the “professionalization” (Muller 1999) of campaigning has had its
origin1 (Plasser 2000). Arguably, nowhere else is political campaigning a bigger business then
in the United States. However, despite increased political consultancy and the hundreds of
millions of campaign spending, the average voter turnout since 1980 during the Presidential
election years has only been 56%; see also Table 1.
Table 1 shows voter turnout, total spending of presidential candidates since 1980 as well as
total spending adjusted for inflation at 2008 CPI (consumer price index) rates (i.e., real ex-
penditures). Figure 1 shows the bivariate relationship between turnout and the logarithm
of real total campaign expenditures per eligible voter along with a fitted linear regression
line. While some caution is warranted when interpreting a linear regression fitted to just
8 observations, there is clearly a positive association. The 2004 and 2008 elections saw espe-
cially increased expenditures per voter accompanied by a noticable increase in voter turnout.
Given the relationship between campaign spending and turnout, campaigns are well advised
to spend money on mobilizing voters (Baek 2009; Hall and Bonneau 2008). However, as
campaigns increasingly face limited resources and budget constraints (in addition to public
sentiment against excessive spending during times of economic hardship), it is important to
allocate resources as efficiently as possible.
From a marketing point of view, voter mobilization is a two-step process (cf. Goldstein and
Ridout 2002). In the first step, campaigns need to craft measures that best motivate people
1The professionalization of politial campaigning spread form the US to many democratic countries all over
the world (Sussman and Galizio 2003). Accordingly we will focus on the US system but the ideas are easily
generalizable to other democratic countries as well.
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Year Turnout (in %) Expenditures (in mill. USD) Real expenditures (at 2008 rates)
2008 61.7 1,324.7 1,324.7
2004 60.1 717.9 818.2
2000 54.2 343.1 429.0
1996 51.7 239.9 329.2
1992 58.1 192.2 295.0
1988 52.8 210.7 383.5
1984 55.2 103.6 214.7
1980 54.2 92.3 241.2
Mean 56.0 403.1 504.4
Sd 3.6 422.0 381.6
Min 51.7 92.3 214.7
Max 61.7 1,324.7 1,324.7
Table 1: Individual and aggregated turnout rate (votes for highest office divided by the voting-
eligible population) for presidential elections in the United States and the money spent by
all candidates (in million USD). The fourth column lists the real expenditures (inflation-
adjusted at 2008 rates). Source: McDonald (2012) and http://www.opensecrets.org/ and
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
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Figure 1: The relationship between real expenditures per eligible voter (in USD, log-scale)
and turnout (in %) in the US since 1980 along with fitted linear regression (solid line). The
model has R2 = 0.52 and its slope implies an expected increase of turnout by 0.5 percentage
points for a 10% increase of expenditures per eligible voter.
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2008 2006 2004
Expenditures (in USD) 2,501,605 2,231,941 1,848,822
Votes received 164,562 71,651 113,040
Cost per vote (in USD) 15.20 31.15 16.36
Table 2: Election costs for Congressman Barrow (Georgia’s 12th congressional district).
Source: Secretary of State, Georgia, http://www.opensecrets.org/.
to turn up at the polls, i.e., to assure the effectiveness of mobilization. In the second step,
campaigns need to identify suitable people that should be subjected to these measures (also
known as voter targeting).
The first step includes decisions on which marketing measures to use. Since many measures
lack in effectiveness, numerous studies have been designed on this subject, investigating diverse
measures such as TV ads, canvassing and face-to-face contacting, telephone calls or negative
campaigning (e.g., Green and Gerber 2008; Hansen and Bowers 2009; Ridout 2009; Lau,
Sigelman, and Rovner 2007; Gillespie 2010).
In the second step of the marketing process, campaigns need to identify the “right” recipients
for these marketing messages. To our knowledge, there has only been little work on this
topic in the literature, some notable exceptions including Wielhouwer (2003); Parry, Barth,
Kropf, and Jones (2008) or Murray and Scime (2010). Identifying the right people to target is
important because it reduces wasteful spending (e.g., targeting a person who is very unlikely,
or not even eligible, to vote would be considered extremely wasteful) and allows campaigns
to efficiently allocate their limited resources.
As point in case consider Table 2 which shows how much money has been spent by the
campaign of Congressman Barrow of Georgia’s 12th congressional district, and how many
votes he received in three consecutive election years (in the US, members of the house of
representatives get elected every two years). During each of the three elections, the campaign
spent similar amounts of money, however, in 2006 it cost the campaign double the amount of
money for each vote it received. Assuming that the campaign was targeting roughly the same
voters in all three elections, one cannot help but wonder whether it would have been better to
target a lower number of people in 2006 (a midterm election year where turnout is generally
lower). The identification of people who only vote in general elections might have helped in
order to spend the available resources more efficiently. For such a precise identification of
voters, statistics offers a number of suitable tools.
1.2. Voter targeting in get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns
In his standard source on political targeting, Malchow (2008, p. 1) defines voter targeting
as “. . . the process by which a campaign predicts which voters it needs to persuade to win.”
These voters include those who are undecided as well as those who are in favor of the issue at
hand, at least in principle, but who need some encouragement to turnout. Malchow (2008)
opines that efficient identification and prediction of which voter should be targeted is going
to be one of the future major issues in campaigning. This is also reflected in his alternate
definition of targeting as being “the process of determining which voters you need for victory
and identifying them as efficiently as possible” (Malchow 2008, p. 7).
This goal of voter targeting shares similar objectives with that of consumer targeting in mar-
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keting. However, there are several structural reasons as to why political campaign marketing
differs from that of consumer marketing. Following Quelch (2008) these are: (i) the lower
number of choices for voters in general elections than for consumers, (ii) that voters have to
live with the majority’s decision which might dampen their enthusiasm and (iii) that most of
the voters only get to vote every couple of years on a fixed date while consumers can usually
decide when to when and where purchase. Additionally, (iv), singling out a niche may work
fine for marketing a product, but politicians cannot win by targeting just a single segment
as they need to get the majority of votes. This may be the reason why political marketing is
generally considered to be less successful than consumer marketing.
How is targeting carried out?
Campaigns basically try to mobilize voters who (however loosely) identify themselves with
any party or candidate. They do not necessarily try to convince voters to cast their ballot
for a specific candidate. Thus they may simply aim at increasing the number of people who
show up at polls. Malchow (2008) describes targeting for turnout as a targeting procedure
for which the campaign needs to know or predict the likelihood that a voter will actually
vote, regardless of whether it is for persuasion or mobilization purposes, as well as making a
strategic decision which range of prediction is of interest.
To make such predictions, campaigns are employing many different techniques, some of which
are founded in statistical reasoning. This also pertains to the campaigns gearing up for the
2012 presidential election which are showing a strong interest in statistics for decision making.
President Obama’s campaign is actively seeking for data miners to join his campaign for
reelection234. In addition, not only the incumbent is seeking help from statistics, but also
some of his challengers such as the Texas Governor, Rick Perry56. The increased media
coverage of the importance of statistics in election campaigns supports this effect.
When targeting voters, campaigns rely on data that are either public or proprietary. Public
data offer a limited number of variables such as aggregate number of turnout, while data sets
from proprietary sources often contain much richer information. Usually the most important
variables that are collected are records of the individual voting history. The aptitude of voting
history as a predictor for future election attendance has already been established (Denny and
Doyle 2009) and consequently it is the gold standard in targeting (Malchow 2008). However
there might be predictive power in additional variables that are often ignored.
Traditionally, campaigns have relied on simple deterministic rules for choosing who to target,
e.g., using information from the last four comparable elections as the main predictors for future
voting behavior. Intuitively, someone who voted in all four out of the last four elections is
seen as a most likely voter whereas someone who did not vote in any of the four elections is
very unlikely to vote now. However, forecasting the behavior of persons with other patterns
(i.e., who voted sometimes but not always) is not clear in this very simple setup.
This has sparked interest in adopting probabilistic approaches in place of deterministic rules
2http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/09/tech/innovation/obama-data-crunching-election/index.html
3http://andrewgelman.com/2011/10/data-mining-efforts-for-obamas-campaign/
4http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0711/Obama_campaign_hiring_data_mining_scientists.
html
5http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/rick-perrys-scientific-campaign-method/
6http://www.campaignsandelections.com/magazine/us-edition/267417/technology-bytes-
perryand39s-social-scientists-and-obamaand39s-data-brigade.thtml
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based solely on the voting history. For instance, Malchow (2008) promotes a linear probability
model as well as tree-like models such as CHAID (Kass 1980) for political microtargeting.
Murray and Scime (2010) suggest decision trees as well. Other state-of-the-art approaches
that are used include logistic or probit regression.
When using probabilistic models for GOTV targeting, campaigns are interested in assigning
each voter an individual probability to show up at election day. Based on this estimated
probability, it stands to reason that using targeting plans on people with a value around 0.5
is worthwhile (Malchow 2008), whereas targeting people with predicted probabilities near 0 or
1 is considered a waste. This is in accordance with results on how to best allocate campaign
resources in general (Brams and Davis 1973; Snyder 1989), namely spending more resources
on highly contested seats or states where the race is tight. In fact, a person with a predicted
probability near zero is almost definitely not going to vote, regardless of how compelling the
mobilization message is. A person with a predicted probability of one is going to turn out
at the polls anyways, without the need for extra persuasion. In both cases, targeting those
people would not lead to an increase in turnout, yet it would consume resources and hence be
wasteful. However, voters with a predicted probability in a “targeting range” around 0.5 may
be “convincable” to show up at the polls using the right incentive. Malchow (2008) suggests
a targeting range of [0.3, 0.7]. Clearly, we can be hopeful to sway a person with a probability
of voting of say, 0.35 as long as we get the right message to her. On the other hand, while a
person with a probability of 0.68 might be going to vote without being targeted specifically,
it should not hurt to encourage her a bit more.
1.3. A new unified framework for voter targeting
In this paper we propose a new and flexible statistical framework for voter segmentation that
generalizes two standard models currently used in political targeting. In fact, our framework
encompasses logistic regression as well as classification trees and allows for a combination
of both within the same model. We refer to the resulting framework as logistic regression
tree (LORET) models. LORET models are very flexible in that, in their simplest form, they
reduce to a majority vote (May 1952) or naive Bayes (Hand and Yu 2001) model; on the other
hand, they also allow regression-like modeling of predictors as well as tree-like partitioning of
the sample space under the same umbrella. We investigate LORET models of varying degrees
of flexibility, and compare them with a particular focus on the benefits that they provide for
political decision makers. We apply LORET to a novel data set of Ohio voters and find that,
depending on the nature of the race, different statistical methods lead to relevant differences
in how campaign budgets are best allocated.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a statistical framework for
voter targeting that combines logistic regression models with recursive partitioning. Section
3 describes a case study for which we apply the methods. There, we explain how we evalute
the framework and investigate properties of our targeting approach from a campaign’s point
of view. The corresponding results can be found in Section 4. We finish with conclusions and
some general remarks in Section 5.
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2. LORET: Modeling and predicting voting behavior
Currently, campaigns employ methods like logistic regression or tree-based methods for voter
prediction and targeting (Malchow 2008). Using this as a backdrop, we introduce a gen-
eral framework, logistic regression trees (LORET), that encompasses and extends these ap-
proaches. Briefly, the idea is the following: Instead of fitting a global logistic regression model
to the whole data, one might fit a collection of local regression models to subsets or segments
of the data (i.e., a segmented logistic regression model) in order to obtain a better fit and
higher predictive accuracy. Since usually the “correct” segmentation is not known, it needs to
be learned from the data, for example by using recursive partitioning methods.
In what follows we start with the general formulation for logistic regression models for one
or more segments and then show how for more than one segment, the segmentation can be
learned with recursive partitioning.
2.1. Segmented logistic regression
Let yi ∈ {0, 1} denote a Bernoulli random variable for the i-th observation, i = 1, . . . , N , and
xi denote a p-dimensional covariate vector (xi1, . . . , xip). Let us assume there are r (known or
estimated) disjoint segments in the data. For each segment k = 1, . . . , r, we can then specify
a logistic regression model for the relationship between y and x1, . . . , xp within that segment,
P (yi = 1|xi;β(k)) = pii = exp(x
>
i β
(k))
1 + exp(x>i β
(k))
, (1)
where k = k(i) is the segment to which observation i belongs and pii denotes the probability to
belong to class“1”. The segment-specific parameter vector is β(k) and its estimates are referred
to as βˆ
(k)
, which can be easily obtained (given the segmentation) via maximum likelihood
(see e.g., McCullagh and Nelder 1989). Based on the associated estimated probabilities,
classification can then be done by
yˆi(c0) =
{
1 if pˆii ≥ c0
0 if pˆii < c0.
(2)
where c0 ∈ [0, 1] is a specific cutoff value (but could, in principle, also be specified to be
different for different segments).
If there is only a single segment (i.e., a root node and hence a known segmentation), LORET
in (1) reduces to a logistic regression model. Here the conditional distribution of the response
variable y is estimated given the status of p covariates. Evaluation of the logistic model at
the estimated parameter vector βˆ yields the predicted probabilities, pˆii. If the model uses
no covariates as regressors, it further reduces to a majority vote (May 1952) or naive Bayes
model (Hand and Yu 2001), i.e., a logistic regression model with only an intercept or simply
the relative frequency of class “1” transformed to the logit scale. The upper row in Figure 2
illustrates majority vote and logistic regression on an artificial set of data. The former fits a
single constant, the latter a single logistic function of x to the entire data.
If there are more than one segment and the segmentation were known, then LORET can still
be simply seen as estimating a maximum likelihood model from a binomial likelihood in each
segment. This time however, one needs to specify interactions between factors corresponding
to the segments and the cofficients of a logistic regression model to estimate the LORET.
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Figure 2: A visualization of the different cases of LORET. In the upper left panel there is
the y ∼ 1 | 1 LORET, fitting a constant. In the upper right the y ∼ x | 1 LORET (logistic
regression) is displayed, which is a single function of x for the whole data set. The lower
left panel displays a y ∼ 1 | z LORET where the data set is partitioned based on the state of
predictor variables z and in each partition a constant is fitted. In the lower right panel, the
y ∼ x | z LORET can be found. Here the data set is again partitioned based on z but this
time a logistic function of x is fitted in the partitions. Hence it combines the y ∼ 1 | z and
y ∼ x | 1 LORET.
If the segmentation is unknown, however, it needs to be learned from the data. Two popular
approaches for this are mixture models (e.g., mixtures of experts or latent class regression) or
some type of algorithmic search method. Recursive partitioning (often called a tree, Zhang
and Singer 2010) is a popular example of the latter. Trees are usually induced by splitting the
data set along a function of the predictor variables into a number of partitions or segments.
The segments are usually chosen by minimizing an objective function (e.g., a heterogeneity
measure or a negative log-likelihood) for each segment. The procedure is then repeated
recursively for each resulting partition. This approach approximates real segments in the
data and yields a segmentation for which maximum likelihood estimation of parameters in
each segment can be carried out, as is done in LORET.
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Method Regressor variables Partitioning variables Schema
Majority vote none none y ∼ 1 | 1
Logistic regression yes none y ∼ x | 1
Classification tree none yes y ∼ 1 | z
Model tree yes yes y ∼ x | z
Table 3: Various instances of LORET.
2.2. Recursive partitioning
Let us assume we have an additional, `-dimensional covariate vector z = (z1, . . . , z`). Based
on these covariates we learn the segmentation, i.e., we search for r disjoint cells that partition
the predictor subspace. Depending on whether the logistic model used for y in each segment
has any covariates or just a constant, there are two algorithmic approaches we can use:
classification trees and trees with logistic node models.
Classification trees
If the logistic model is an intercept-only model and we have a number of partitioning variables
z1, . . . , z`, then LORET can be estimated as a classification tree. An illustration of a classifi-
cation tree can be found in the lower left panel of Figure 2, where the data is first partitioned
into three subsets and a intercept-only model is fitted to each subset separately. Hence in
each terminal node the model is a constant. A wide variety of algorithms have been developed
to fit classification trees; among them are: CHAID (Kass 1980), CART (Breiman, Friedman,
Olsen, and Stone 1984), C4.5 (Quinlan 1993), QUEST (Loh and Shih 1997), CTree (Hothorn,
Hornik, and Zeileis 2006) and many others. In this paper, we use CART and CTree, which
are examples of a biased and an unbiased tree algorithm, respectively.
Trees with logistic node models
If there are partitioning variables z = (z1, . . . , z`) as well as regressor variables for the logistic
node model x = (x1, . . . , xp), we get the most general type of LORET, which is a“model tree”.
The model is illustrated in the lower right panel in Figure 2. Like in a classification tree, the
data is first partitioned into subsets. However, in contrast to a classification tree, separate
logistic regressions with regressors are employed in each terminal node. Thus, the resulting
model tree essentially combines data-driven partitioning like a classification tree with model-
based prediction in a single approach. Different algorithms have been proposed to estimate
model trees with logistic node models, including: SUPPORT (Chaudhuri, Lo, Loh, and Yang
1995), LOTUS (Chan and Loh 2004), LMT (Landwehr, Hall, and Eibe 2005), and MOB
(Zeileis, Hothorn, and Hornik 2008). In what follows, we will use the MOB algorithm with a
logistic node model for estimating the most general version of LORET, as it proved to have
good properties for these kind of data (Rusch and Zeileis 2012).
To simplify notation and to stress the similarities, we will use a simple schema to refer to the
different LORET types (cf. Table 3): The majority vote model will be refered to as y ∼ 1 | 1,
the global logistic regression model as y ∼ x | 1, the classification tree model as y ∼ 1 | z and
the full LORET model as y ∼ x | z.
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3. Case study: Ohio voters 2004
To illustrate our targeting framework, we use a unique set of data from the state Ohio in
the US. Most US states collect and report voter registration information but the data is
not readily and easily accessible (US Election Assistance Comission 2010). The collection
of voter registration data is done at the county level and most of the states aggregate the
data. However, due to technical and resource limitations, political campaigns often turn
to political and marketing data providers who add value by collecting, maintaining, and
updating the voter registration data. The voter registration data would typically include
name, address, phone, gender, party affiliation, age, vote history (elections that each voter
voted), and ethnicity (in many of the southern states). The data providers not only add value
by standardizing the data that is collected from each state or county, they also add other
potentially relevant behavioral information such as income, type of occupation, education,
presence of children, property status (rental or owning), and charities that the person donated
to. We use such a proprietary data set which was provided by Aristotle, Inc., one of the leading
campaign application and data providers in the industry.
Our data set consists of 20, 000 eligible voters from Ohio. Ohio has proven to be an important
state because in every election since 1964, the winner of that state has ultimately won the
presidency. Also since 2000, the presidential vote difference between the Republican and
Democratic candidates has been 4% or lower. Thus Ohio has been considered one of the top
“battleground” states in every recent election.
3.1. Data description
Our set of data includes a total of 77 variables, many which are socio-demographic categorical
variables like gender, job category or education level. The data set also contains records on
past voting behavior from 1990 to 2004 in general elections, primary or presidential primary
elections and other elections (all coded as binary variables – i.e., voted or not). We added three
composite or aggregate variables: the raw count of elections a person attended, the number of
elections a person attended since registering and the relative frequency of attended elections
since registering. After removal of missing values and inconsistent entries, there are a total of
N = 19634 records with 80 variables per record. Our target variable is the voting behavior
(“yes”/“no”) in the 2004 presidential election. This election is considered to be unusual in the
campaign’s high emphasis on face-to-face voter mobilization within neighborhoods and social
networks (Middleton and Green 2008) as well as the sharp increase in turnout (see Table 1)
and is therefore particularly well suited for illustration.
3.2. Two sets of predictors: Voting history only vs. kitchen sink data
As pointed out earlier, campaigns relied on very limited information when it comes to political
targeting. While some of the literature on voter targeting also recommends taking into account
a person’s age (Malchow 2008; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008), the most commonly and
often solely used piece of information is the person’s voting history (Malchow 2008). Thus,
one of the goals of this study is to investigate the potential benefits of including additional
information (besides a person’s voting history) into the targeting model. To that end, we
compare and contrast two sets of predictors:
 The first set employs the standard information used by many campaigns, which is also
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LORET Regressor variables Partitioning variables Partitioning algorithm
y ∼ 1 | 1 none none –
y ∼ s | 1 s none –
y ∼ s+ e | 1 s+ e none –
y ∼ 1 | s none s CART, CTree
y ∼ 1 | s+ e none s+ e CART, CTree
y ∼ s | e s e MOB
Table 4: LORET versions combined with the two variable groups and the algorithms used to
estimate the partition. The standard variable set of age and voting history is labeled “s” and
the set of additional variables with “e” (hence all variables together are “s+ e”).
recommended in literature. The standard variables used by campaigns are a person’s
voting history, recorded over the the last four elections, and age. We call this set “s” for
“standard”.
 The second set contains all other variables available, i.e., ‘the “kitchen sink”. In our
case this includes variables like gender, occupation, living situation, party affiliation,
party makeup of the household (“partyMix”), position within the family (“hhRank” and
“hhHead”), donations for various causes, education level, relative frequency of attended
elections so far (“attendance”) and many others. These variables constitute a set of
additional variables, labeled with “e” for “extended”.
3.3. Model specification
The combination of the two variable sets with the different LORET models leads to model
specifications as displayed in Table 4. The models either employ only the standard set of
variables or the combination of the standard and the extended set. For unpartitioned models,
the parameters are estimated with maximum likelihood. If a partition is induced, we learn it
with three different algorithms (CART, CTree and MOB) depending on the nature of the node
model. Please note that if age is specified as a parameter in the logistic model part (i.e., for
models y ∼ s | 1, y ∼ s+e | 1 and y ∼ s | e), a quadratic effect will be used (cf. Rusch and Zeileis
2012). If age is included as a partitioning variable we use the untransformed variable since
partitioning algorithms are invariant to monotone transformations such as taking squares.
All recursive partitioning algorithms that we employ allow for tuning with metaparameters.
These tuning parameters can be used to avoid overfitting of the tree algorithms and control
how branchy the tree becomes. Quite generally it can be said that the less branchy a tree is,
the less prone it is to overfitting. In the algorithms we used, a higher number of observations
per node, a lower tree depth, and a stricter split variable selection criterion all lead to smaller
trees. At the same time our specification should grant enough flexibility for the algorithm to
approximate a complex non-linear relationship in the data.
For CART the maximal depth of the tree and the minimum number of observation per node
(minsplit) are available to control the tree appearance. We use a maximal tree depth of 7 and a
minsplit of 100 (which corresponds to roughly 0.5% of the observations). For CTree and MOB
the significance level of the association or stability tests respectively and the minimum number
of observation per node can be used to tune the algorithm. We employ a global significance
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level of α = 1 × 10−6. This appeared sensible since the high number of observations might
easily lead to spurious significance that is mainly due to the sample size. Hence we reduce
the probability of “false positive” selection of a split variable or split point by specifying a low
significance level. For minsplit we use 100 for CTree (the same as for CART) and 1000 for
MOB (which enables reliable estimation of the node model).7
3.4. Model evaluation
We compare the different LORET specifications in terms of their ability to predict potential
voters accurately and to allow for efficient targeting. Of particular interest is how data-
driven approaches like trees compare to the model-driven approach of logistic regression and
whether the combination of the two can lead to substantial improvements. We measure
the performance of all models with different learning and test sets using different data- and
domain-driven criteria. These criteria include standard measures from the data mining litera-
ture (such as predictive accuracy and ROC curves), and measures that arise from an election
campaign and voter targeting practitioner point of view. We elaborate on each of these in
more detail below. Additionally, we put emphasis on the interpretability of the models and
model parameters that result from applying the LORET framework.
Learning and test samples via bootstrapping
We employ the benchmarking framework of Hothorn, Leisch, Zeileis, and Hornik (2005) to
evaluate and compare different models via bootstrapping (see also Efron and Tibshirani 1993;
Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009). That is, we fit a model based on a learning set of
size N which is sampled randomly (with replacement) from the entire set of data. The fitted
model is then used to predict the out-of-bag test set which consists of observations that were
not part of the learning sample. Ten folds of learning and test samples, f = 1, . . . , 10 were
used. To provide a further benchmark, we also train and evaluate all models on the whole
data set. This allows us to gauge the tendency of a model to overfit as well as how close
out-of-bag and in-sample performance are.
Measuring predictive accuracy
For each method, we assess the classification accuracy (accf ) on each test set f at a given
cutoff value c0 = 0.5
8. To estimate overall predictive accuracy, we use the average over all
bootstrap samples acc. When using the full data set as training and test set (i.e., within-
sample performance), we denote the accuracy by acc0.
Furthermore, we use the ROC curve for model comparison. It displays the false positive rate
vs. the true positive rate. For a given threshold value, we average the ROC curves across all
bootstrap samples. The area under the ROC curve for bootstrap sample f , aucf , serves as
a cutoff-independent measure of classification accuracy and we calculate it via the Wilcoxon
statistic (Wilcoxon 1945). Once again, we average it over all bootstrap samples, auc and use
7The results were not sensitive to the choice of metaparameters. For CART, we explored depths from 3 to
20. For the global significance levels of CTree and MOB, we explored values of 0.0001, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005,
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1. For the minimum number of observations a node must contain we explored values of 20,
50, 100, 150, 200, 250 and 500 for all methods. For these choices of depth, number of observations per node
and significance level, the results were very similar.
8For simplicity, we use the same cutoff value of 0.5 for all segments k.
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auc0 to denote the in-sample area under the curve. For all the classification measures above,
higher values imply better predictive capability. By using simultaneous pairwise confidence
intervals (using Tukey’s all-pairwise comparison contrasts and controlling for the family-wise
error rate, cf. Hothorn, Bretz, and Westfall 2008), we assess whether differences in predictive
accuracy (between two models) are significant or not. To account for the dependence structure
of bootstrap samples, we center the accuracies beforehand (see Hothorn et al. 2005).
Measuring targeting effectiveness
While the above measures are interesting from a statistical point of view, a campaign may also
want to gauge the monetary gain from applying LORET for targeting. Hence we investigate
the targeting effectiveness in a simulated targeting environment.
A targeting range (such as [0.3, 0.7]) will contain both voters and non-voters. That is, it
will contain individuals who will vote regardless of whether we target them with a customized
message or not – and, as we have argued earlier, spending resources on such individuals might
be a waste. However, the targeting range will also contain individuals who would not have
voted out of their own motivation, but who, with the help of the right targeting message at
the right time, will change their mind and will go to the polling stations after all. We will
refer to these latter individuals broadly as “non-voters.” Spending resources on non-voters is
not wasteful, especially if there is a chance of swaying them. Thus, a targeting method is
most effective, if – for a given targeting range – it identifies the largest number of non-voters
and at the same time the lowest number of voters. We therefore assess the cost-benefit of a
targeting method in the following way:
Since we know the outcome for the data at hand, we can treat each training/test sample as
a possible targeting situation and compare costs for the presented methodology. We assign a
monetary value to convincing a real non-voter to attend an election and see how the different
LORET models fare in terms of overall cost. To do this we use a linear cost-benefit function
for every method m which can be set up for each test sample f, f = 1, . . . , 10.
Let o denote the number of individuals identified in the targeting range (i.e., with predicted
probabilities within [0.3, 0.7]). We target each of these individuals (e.g., by mail, telephone,
email, etc) which incurs a cost of c per individuum. Thus, the overall cost of targeting all
o individuals equals o × c. Let us assume that out of these o targeted individuals, n were
non-voters. Let us assume further that our targeting efforts are effective in the sense that they
turn a fraction v of all non-voters into a voter. In other words, while there are n non-voters,
our targeting actions turns n × v of them into voters. Turning non-voters into voters can
be assumed to carry a monetary benefit and we denote that benefit by b. Thus, the overall
benefit of targeting equals n× v × b. This leads to a cost-benefit equation of the form
s = (n× v × b)− (o× c) (3)
Here, s stands for either the loss (if s is negative and hence o × c bigger than n × v × b) or
gain (if s is positive and hence o× c smaller than n× v × b) of targeting. Notice that o and
n depend on the chosen LORET version, so we index it with the superscript m. In addition,
each test sample is different hence they also depend on the bootstrap sample f . Thus, let o
(m)
f
denote the number of individuals which model m applied to bootstrap sample f predicts to
be in the targeting range. Similarly, let n
(m)
f denote all the non-voters contained in o
(m)
f . We
compute the cost-benefit of model m for our hypothetical targeting situation by computing
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the average over all bootstrap samples.
s¯(m) =
1
F
F∑
f=1
(n
(m)
f × v × b)− (o(m)f × c) (4)
For each model m, we explore s¯(m) over a range of plausible values for v, b and c.
We also investigate the break-even point, b0, i.e., the minimum benefit value of turning a non-
voter into a voter for which, at a given targeting cost per person and a given effectiveness,
the overall cost-benefit equals zero. We calculate it via the identity
b
(m)
0f =
o
(m)
f × c
n
(m)
f × v
, (5)
which is proportional to the ratio of people in the targeting range and the number of real
non-voters for a given ratio of targeting cost and targeting effectiveness
(
b
(m)
0f ∝
o
(m)
f
n
(m)
f
)
. Again
we average over all bootstrap samples f to get b¯
(m)
0 .
4. Results
In this section, we compare the methods from Section 2 using the measures described in
Section 3.
4.1. Predictive accuracy
Looking at Figure 3 which shows boxplots of the predictive accuracy for the bootstrap samples
as well as the within-sample accuracy (denoted by a cross) at a cutoff value of 0.5, one can
see quite clearly how the different models from Table 4 behave. First, using both variable sets
(the standard set and the extended set together) leads to a huge improvement in predictive
accuracy as compared to just using the standard set. Interestingly, the improvement of using
both the “s” and “e” variables over using only “s” is bigger than the improvement of using
only “s” over using no covariates at all (cf. Figure 3). Second, LORET versions that employ
recursive partitioning feature a better performance than global regression models alone. This
holds for either using only the standard variable set as well as the combination of extended
and standard set. This can also be seen in Figure 4 which displays the average classification
accuracies as a function of different cutoff values in the upper panel and the mean ROC curves
in the lower panel (averaged over the F = 10 out-of-bag samples).
Table 5 gives a detailed summary of the different performance measures for all models. The
benchmark of the naive model y ∼ 1 | 1 is an average prediction accuracy of acc = 70.36%
and an average AUC of auc = 0.5, averaged over all test sets.
Global logistic regression models y ∼ s | 1 and y ∼ s + e | 1 display improved performance
(acc = 74.97% and auc = 0.740 for the standard set and acc = 84.57% and auc = 0.886 for
the combined set) with a huge improvement of the model that uses both variable sets.
Both classification tree algorithms, CART and CTree, used to estimate y ∼ 1 | s and y ∼
1 | s+ e result in a generally better performance compared to logistic regressions, both on the
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ly ~ 1 | 1
y ~ s | 1
y ~ 1 | s 
 (CART)
y ~ 1 | s 
 (CTree)
y ~ s + e | 1
y ~ 1 | s + e 
 (CART)
y ~ 1 | s + e 
 (CTree)
y ~ s | e
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Figure 3: Boxplots of accuracies for all 10 out-of-bag samples for each LORET instances. The
cross denotes the within-sample prediction accuracies of each model (acc0).
standard set of predictors as well as for combining the standard and the extended set. Their
performance peaks for the combined set with values of acc = 85.96% and auc = 0.878 for
y ∼ 1 | s+ e (CART) and acc = 85.78% and auc = 0.898 for y ∼ 1 | s+ e (CTree).
For the LORET that uses the standard set of predictors as the model in the terminal nodes
of the tree and the extended set of predictors for partitioning, i.e., y ∼ s | e result values of
acc = 85.98% and auc = 0.906, respectively. Notice that this model yields the best mean
AUC and, at this cutoff, the highest mean accuracy.
The performance differences of models using only standard variables and models employing
both the standard and the extended variable sets are evident (see Table 5 and Figure 3).
Makin use of the additional variables leads to highly improved performance.
However, the differences among the models employing the combined set themselves (espe-
cially between global logistic regression model and partitioned models) are not that strong.
Therefore, to establish that these performance differences are not just due to chance, we cal-
culated simultaneous 95%-confidence intervals of all pairwise performance differences between
the models that use the combined set of variables based on their accuracy as well as AUC.
The former can be found in the upper panel of Figure 5, the latter in the lower panel. We
can see that the global logistic regression model performs significantly worse compared to the
partitioned models. The tree methods perform best in terms of the accuracy and there are
no significant differences amongst them. In contrast, in terms of the cutoff free measure AUC
the y ∼ s | e LORET significantly outperforms all other methods.
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Figure 4: Performance indicators for different models. The upper panel displays features the
average accuracies for the range of different cutoffs for the various LORET instances (for
majority vote the average accuracy is displayed as a constant). The lower panel features the
averaged receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for the different models. Threshold
averaging has been used for all methods except majority vote.
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Figure 5: Simultaneous pairwise confidence intervals of the differences of mean accuracies at
a cutoff 0.5 over all 10 out-of-bag samples (upper panel) and differences of the average area
under the ROC curve (AUC) over all 10 out-of-bag samples (lower panel) for all methods
employing the combination of the standard and extended variable set.
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Method Bootstrap samples Full sample
acc se(acc) auc p r˜ acc0 auc0 p0 r0
y ∼ 1 | 1 0.704 0.004 0.500 1 1.0 0.703 0.500 1 1
y ∼ s | 1 0.750 0.002 0.740 8 1.0 0.749 0.739 8 1
y ∼ 1 | s (CTree) 0.759 0.004 0.765 1 15.0 0.761 0.762 1 14
y ∼ 1 | s (CART) 0.760 0.005 0.745 1 28.5 0.768 0.746 1 27
y ∼ s+ e | 1 0.846 0.003 0.886 57 1.0 0.848 0.888 57 1
y ∼ 1 | s+ e (CTree) 0.858 0.003 0.898 1 18.0 0.857 0.898 1 18
y ∼ 1 | s+ e (CART) 0.860 0.004 0.878 1 23.5 0.863 0.886 1 23
y ∼ s | e 0.860 0.004 0.906 8 9.5 0.860 0.909 8 8
Table 5: Summary of performance indicators for each LORET instance. For the bootstrap
samples, auc means the area under the ROC curve averaged over all 10 out-of-bag test sets.
acc is the overall classification accuracy averaged over all test sets and se(acc) its standard
error. Complexity is given as the number of estimated parameters per segment (terminal node)
p and the median number of segments r˜. For the full sample models (fitted and evaluated on
all observations), the accuracy is given by acc0, the AUC by auc0 and the number of terminal
nodes and cofficients in each node by r0 and p0, respectively.
4.2. Cost-benefit analysis
We evaluate the cost-benefit equation in (4) for each of our candidate models9. To that
end, we investigate a range of scenarios for c (the cost of targeting a single person), b (the
monetary benefit of turning a non-voter into a voter) and v (the effectiveness of a targeting
message, that is, the proportion of non-voters that it will convert to voters). In fact, for c
we investigate values of USD 5 and 15 as examples of low and high targeting costs. This
is reasonable, since the 2008 Obama campaign spent roughly USD 8 on each vote President
Obama got. Furthermore, we assume that the effectiveness v of a campaign can be either 0.3
or 0.1. While 0.3 is probably quite optimistic, a value of 0.1 would only require mobilizing
every 10th non-voter to go to the polls. Putting a number on the monetary benefit b of turning
a non-voter into a voter is the biggest challenge. In fact, b might be very small for campaigns
that are expected to win in a landslide (i.e., for campaigns where one or two extra voters do
not make any difference). However, for campaigns that expect a very close race, b might be
extremely large. One example from recent history is the 2000 presidential election. In that
election, George W. Bush won the State of Florida (and subsequently the presidency) from
Al Gore by a margin of about only 500 votes (see, e.g., Agresti and Presnell 2002). Clearly,
in such tight races, campaigns would put an extremely large value on b. In our analysis, we
investigate values of b ranging between USD 0 and USD 500.
Figure 6 shows the results. The abscissa refers to different values of b; on the ordinate we
find s¯(m) as defined in (4). Notice that positive values of s¯(m) correspond to a monetary gain;
negative values indicate losses. Figure 6 displays scenarios for the four different combinations
of c and v, starting with c = 5 and v = 0.3 (top left panel) and ending with c = 15 and
v = 0.1 (bottom right panel).
9We only evaluate it for models based on the complete set of predictors since we have found in the previous
section that using the standard set of predictors only leads to suboptimal performance.
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Figure 6: Average linear cost-benefit functions for different versions of LORET. The assumed
costs c were USD 5 and USD 15 and the assumed efficacy v of the targeting measure was 0.3
and 0.1. The monetary benefit for turning a non-voter into a voter is depicted on the x-axis,
the overall loss (s¯ < 0) or gain (s¯ > 0) of the targeting is displayed on the y-axis. The
targeting range was [0.3, 0.7].
We can see that the slopes of the cost-benefit function is lowest for classification trees y ∼
1 | s+e. For the CART-based classification tree however, the intercept is highest. This means
that for a small benefit b of turning a non-voter into a voter and for a high cost c of targeting,
a CART-based classification tree will perform best (i.e., leads to the lowest cost), but only
in the loss region (i.e., the lowest loss occurs). With increasing values of b, y ∼ s + e | 1 and
y ∼ s | e both perform increasingly better – notice the much larger slope which suggests that
both methods are especially valuable when there is a large benefit in turning a non-voter
into a voter (such as in a tight races). Here, the global logistic regression model eventually
performs best for high values of b. The implication for election campaigns is that the LORET
framework can be used as a toolbox to increase monetary efficiency of voter targeting, tailor-
made for different circumstances. Exactly how it should be used depends on the nature of
the race.
Regarding the break even point (which is proportional to
of
nf
, the ratio of people in targeting
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range to the number of real non-voters for a given ratio of cost and effectiveness), we calculate
the mean of the
of
nf
as b¯0 = 2.06 for y ∼ s+e | 1, b¯0 = 2.09 for y ∼ s | e, b¯0 = 2.15 for y ∼ 1 | s+e
(CART) and b¯0 = 2.46 for y ∼ 1 | s + e (CTree) under the assumption of USD 1 targeting
cost and perfect effectiveness of the targeting measures (i.e., v = 1). Hence, ceteris paribus,
targeting with y ∼ s+ e | 1 amortizes targeting costs fastest, closely followed by y ∼ s | e.
4.3. Interpretability of LORET models
Apart from being able to provide a high classification accuracy, the LORET framework allows
to fit interpretable and easily intelligible models that provide further insight into the dynamics
of voting behavior relevant for voter targeting. This is one of the major strengths of this
approach as compared to “black-box” methods with high predictive capabilities. As point in
case, consider the most general LORET, y ∼ s | e. Since it has the highest accuracy and AUC
and enables efficient targeting for a high benefit of turning non-voters around, we fit it to the
whole data set to shed more light on its performance and the turnout of our sample. A table
of the decision rules and the coefficients for the logistic regression model in each terminal
node can be found in Table 6.
We can see that the segmentation is driven by only four variables, the party composition
of the household for each voter (“partyMix”), the relative frequency of attended elections
(“attendance”), the rank of the individual in the household (“hhRank”, with “1” being highest
and“3+”being lowest) and if the person is the head (“H”) or a member (“M”) of the household
(“hhHead”). Hence most partitioning variables are concerned with the household structure
rather than with individual-level variables. This is in accordance with literature on the
importance of the household for voting behavior (e.g., Cutts and Fieldhouse 2009). We can
further see that for all of those individuals for whom “partyMix” is unknown, the probability
to vote is zero (actually a case of quasi-complete separation, Albert and Anderson 1984).
The segmentation gives rise to different logistic models that provide additional targeting
suggestions for a campaign. We find substantial heterogeneity in the data set as to how
voting history influences the outcome. For instance, in node 7 (people who attended elections
quite often so far) we see that a higher turnout in earlier elections is associated with a relatively
low probability to vote in 2004. Hence these people usually cast their ballot, but for some
reason they did less so in 2004. This appears to be a segment that would have been ready for
targeting.
The influence of age is also interesting. We specified a quadratic effect and see that, apart
from node 10, the estimated probability increases with increasing age just to slow down and
reverse. This turning point is rather high for nodes 7, 8 and 10 (70 to more than a 100 years)
but substantial in nodes 12 (53.5 years) and 13 (51.1 years). For node 10 it is even at an
age of 42. Node 10 is special insofar as it contains young people that have a low rank in the
household.
5. Conclusions
In this paper a framework for voter targeting has been proposed, that combines ideas of trees
with the idea of logistic regression, coined LORET. The performance of different specifications
of LORET with different algorithms in terms of predictive accuracy as well as intelligibility
of the models for an exemplary data set has been investigated. Furthermore, a simple linear
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cost-benefit analysis of targeting within this framework has been illustrated.
We find that the flexibility introduced by the tree structure leads to more accurate predictions.
Furthermore, the framework enables the use of different targeting strategies for different
situations. It is easy to understand or communicate to people who are familiar with logistic
regression and/or trees and as such the framework is well suited for the purpose of voter
targeting.
Regarding the special cases of LORET, a tree with a logistic node model (estimated with the
MOB algorithm) may be the most useful default version. For our data, it has the best cutoff-
independent predictive accuracy (measured by AUC) and the highest predictive accuracy (at
a cutoff of 0.5). Additionally it has the advantage of being easily intelligible and of providing
insight for refined targeting. As a result, decisions based on the y ∼ s | e LORET are easy
to communicate to campaigns that already use logistic regression. Furthermore it has good
potential for cost-efficient targeting, at least based on our sample.
The other instances of LORET, however, are not without merit either. Specifically, a LORET
of the y ∼ 1 | s+ e type is a good choice if it is not clear how the functional form in the nodes
should look like or if there is no standard set of variables to be used in the terminal nodes.
Here the nonparametric nature of classification trees show their advantage. If the focus of
targeting lies in reducing targeting costs alone, logistic regression and model trees allow most
flexible resource allocation and hence may lead to most efficent targeting. For our data set,
targeting based on the y ∼ s + e | 1 LORET performed best in the cost-benefit analysis.
Therefore, even a LORET with just a root node can come in handy.
With the benefits analysed above, one would consider how to incorporate this technique into
the overall campaign strategy. Although it is outside of the scope of this study, it needs to be
pointed out that it is important for the campaigns to implement any GOTV programs on the
likely supporters of the campaign if the intention is to increase the turnout of the supporters.
There are three ways that campaigns target likely supporters. First, campaigns use voting
results data per precinct from previous elections and gather a general understanding of the
demographic and geographic profile of potential supporters. Second, more commonly, they
conduct polls with representative samples. The additional benefit of running the polls is that
the campaign can be more specific in profiling potential supporters and issues that would
motivate them to turn out to vote. Third, campaigns use short surveys over the phone or
go door to door interviewing voters to identify individuals who are supporters as well as
potential supporters. The primary benefit of using this method is that campaigns can have
specific individual level identification of potential supporters. This would also give campaigns
the ability to customize communications to each individual. Once the campaigns have better
knowledge of the potential voters profile and the likelihood of them voting, campaigns can
maximize the return for each dollar spent targeting potential voters by communicating on
issues that matter to them and only target voters who are likely to turn out to vote.
Another use of this modelling technique would be to suppress potential supporters of the
opposition. This is often called negative campaigning or using“dirty tricks”, but it is logical for
campaigns to use this method to target voters who might fit into a profile that classify them as
potential but not strong supporters of the campaign’s opponent. Common ways the campaigns
often incorporate this strategy would be to send negative attack message about the opponent
to discredit the opponent’s character or even distort facts to create confusion. Another tactic
that a campaign could use is to assist or send anonymous support for another candidate
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that shares the similar political philosophy. For example, for the 1992 presidential election,
Ross Perot was an independent candidate; however he had a great amount of support from
mostly republican party supporters. The democratic candidate Bill Clinton benefited from
Perot dividing the republican electorate. In 2000, the democratic campaign was faced with
the similar problem. Ralph Nader was an independent presidential candidate that attracted
support from primarily democrats. The republican candidate George W. Bush benefited from
it as his opponents had to campaign for the same pot of voters.
The bottom line is that this framework does not change the commonly used campaign tac-
tics but it would influence campaign strategy because it is a more precise tool that would
allow campaigns to target the recipients of positive or negative messages more accurately and
efficiently which would give more options. With the LORET framework, campaigns have
a flexible and versatile toolbox for GOTV targeting that can be customized to meet the
requirements at hand.
For further research and practical application, it is possible to improve aspects of interest in
GOTV campaigns. For example, it might be fruitful to use techniques such as artificial neural
networks or ensembles of tree methods to improve predictive accuracy10. Regularized logistic
regression models might prove to be a sensible alternative to the tree approach, especially in
terms of interpretability and variable selection. It could also be interesting to improve the
cost-benefit aspect by defining an appropriate objective function that explicitly incorporates
the targeting costs which can then be minimized to yield LORET models that use these
specific loss functions rather than the standard ones.
Computational details
All calculations have been carried out with the statistical software R 2.12.0–2.14.1 (R Devel-
opment Core Team 2011). Logistic regression was fitted with the glm() function. Recursive
partitioning infrastructure was provided by the packages party for mob() (Zeileis et al. 2008)
and ctree() (Hothorn et al. 2006), as well as rpart (Therneau and Atkinson 1997; Therneau,
Atkinson, and Ripley 2011) for CART. We used the ROCR package (Sing, Sander, Beeren-
winkel, and Lengauer 2005, 2009) for calculating and plotting performance measures and ROC
curves and multcomp (Hothorn et al. 2008) for the simultaenous confidence intervals.
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